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ABSTRACT 
 Purvi Patel is an Indian American woman who, in 2015, was the first U.S. citizen to be 
convicted under feticide statutes for allegedly attempting her own abortion. Though her 2015 
conviction was overturned the same year, the feticide conviction was significant as a legal 
precedent as well as part of a larger trend criminalizing pregnant women of color. With an eye 
towards the greater pattern of the criminalization of other pregnant women of color (Boyd, 1999; 
Faludi, 1991; Humphries, 1999; Mahan, 1996; Roberts, 1997), in this thesis I employ a feminist 
legal studies methodology and the theoretical frameworks of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989, 
1991) and Reproductive Justice (Ross and Solinger, 2017; Silliman et al., 2004) to analyze five 
pro-Patel briefs, two from Patel’s appellate lawyers and three from amici curiae. The four themes 
present are: fetal personhood; racialized gender; medical privacy and trust; and surveillance, 
knowledge, and legitimacy. I argue these briefs were not always consistent with the tenets of 
intersectionality and Reproductive Justice, even as the briefs may have been effective in 
convincing the Court of Appeals to overturn Patel’s conviction. I conclude with a discussion of 
the implications of Patel’s case for public health and law. I suggest that criminalization of 
abortion is harmful to public health and that the feticide mandate as it stands now does not do 
what it was intended to do, which is to protect the pregnant woman from harm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2013, a first-generation Indian American woman named Purvi Patel was charged by 
the State of Indiana with feticide and child neglect for allegedly self-aborting her fetus, and in 
2015, she was convicted of the same charges. This was the first time in the State of Indiana and 
in the United States that a pregnant woman was convicted for killing her own fetus. As such, 
Patel’s was a landmark case that garnered national attention. Despite the significance of the case, 
scholarship on Purvi Patel and her trial has not been forthcoming. This paper addresses that gap. 
Situating her case historically in the context of prosecuted pregnant women and mothers of color, 
I analyze documents from Patel’s case and appeal. Recognizing Purvi Patel as part of a larger 
U.S. trend criminalizing pregnant women and mothers of color serves to highlight how her case 
is both unique and an escalation of an existing pattern. I argue Patel’s case reflects a history of 
discrimination and prosecution of pregnant women and mothers of color for crimes related to 
their pregnancies, is an improper legal use of statutes meant to protect vulnerable persons, and 
accords the fetus greater rights of personhood than the woman carrying it. These legal issues 
reveal the problematic politicization of reproductive rights in the United States in general and the 
unacknowledged particular consequences for women of color.  
To address questions about my positionality, I want to note that I am a cisgender, middle-
class white1 woman within the academy. I also am a reproductive rights advocate. In addition, I 
                                                          
1 Though APA style calls for a capitalization of races, ethnicities, and nationalities, I do not capitalize white as a 
political choice and a subversive act because I believe that existing power structures already privilege whiteness. To 
capitalize white, particularly in a paper about a woman of color, seems inappropriate. 
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lived in Indiana during Patel’s trial. I have vivid memories of the case; I was just starting to 
develop my political and feminist consciousness while watching this case unfold. Thus, this 
paper in some respects is a return to my roots, both to my roots as a feminist and the place I call 
home. 
 Word choice matters. I have had to make difficult decisions about terminology, as the 
language I use can frame the analysis in distinct ways. For clarity’s sake, I use the language of 
the legal documents in my analysis, which often assumes a live birth, when specifically talking 
about or summarizing the documents. This includes referring to Purvi Patel’s fetus as “the baby,” 
and the event in question as “birth” and “death” of that “baby.” However, when making my own 
claims, I use terminology such as “fetus,” “loss of pregnancy,” and “unborn.” I do this because I 
argue that there was not enough evidence to show conclusively that the fetus was born alive, and 
using the terminology of “baby” and the like affords the fetus personhood, which has negative 
implications for reproductive rights. Similarly, I use the term “pregnant women” instead of 
“mothers,” unless citing a source or a particular concept (such as “mother blame” or “crack 
mothers”). I do this in order to prioritize the woman’s identity and also avoid labeling women as 
“mothers” if they do not identify as such. I have also considered my use of the word “women” 
instead of “person” and the implications of this language for my thesis. I think that although 
there are negative implications of criminalized pregnancy for all individuals who can become 
pregnant, regardless of whether they are women, the criminalization of pregnancy is rooted in 
racialized misogyny. For the purposes of this thesis, I believe the use of “women” is more 
appropriate and speaks more to the ways in which pregnancy is a tool used to control the lives of 
cisgender women, particularly women of color. 
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Though I try to make the language of this paper accessible to the average person with no 
legal training, some parts, specifically quotes of legal texts, might be more complex. Some legal 
clarifications regarding Purvi Patel’s case: Class A felonies carry the greatest punishment, 
followed by Class B, Class C, and Class D. The main difference between Class A and Class D 
felonies is sentencing; a Class D crime carries far more reduced sentencing than a Class A. In the 
State of Indiana, Class A felonies carry a sentence of 20-50 years; Class B felonies receive 6-20 
years; Class C gets 2-8 years; and Class D can result in between 6 months to 3 years in prison. 
Fines for felonies can reach $10,000. In Indiana, misdemeanors can result in up to a year in jail 
and $5,000 fines (Indiana Criminal Charges, n.d.). 
My thesis starts with presenting the relevant details of the case, mostly acquired from the 
appeal document (Purvi Patel v. State of Indiana, 2015). I then discuss the U.S. political climate 
toward reproductive rights post-Roe v. Wade (1973), some of the ways in which women of color 
have been criminalized in recent years, legal restrictions on abortion providers and subsequent 
reduced accessibility of abortion, and, finally, fetal personhood and the repercussions of its use 
in feticide laws. Next, I explain my theoretical frameworks, including intersectionality 
(Crenshaw, 1989, 1991) to account for the ways race and gender interacted in Patel’s treatment 
by police, hospital staff, and legal professionals. I also use Reproductive Justice, a theoretical 
framework that asserts the unique perspectives of women of color are not incorporated into the 
reproductive laws that directly affect them. “As activist, scholar, and co-author Loretta Ross puts 
it: ‘Our ability to control what happens to our bodies is constantly challenged by poverty, racism, 
environmental degradation, sexism, homophobia, and injustice in the United States’” (Silliman et 
al., 2004, p. 11). I approach this thesis with a feminist legal studies methodology to analyze five 
pro-Patel briefs from her lawyers and amici curiae, or friends of the court. My goal in analyzing 
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these documents was to determine some of the legal arguments used on behalf of women in cases 
like Patel’s and to determine if these arguments are consistent with Reproductive Justice and 
intersectionality. I conclude this thesis by asserting that Patel’s case codifies the legal 
mechanisms by which the state can charge a woman with feticide, as well as “distributing drugs 
to a minor, child abuse and neglect, reckless endangerment, manslaughter, and assault with a 
deadly weapon” (Roberts, 1997, p. 153), in other words, criminalize her reproductive decisions. 
Moreover, I argue that these processes affect women of color at greater rates than the general 
population of women. Going forward, then, I will use the term “criminalizations” in the plural to 
underscore the multiple ways in which the legal system disproportionally criminalizes women of 
color for their reproductive choices. 
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BACKGROUND 
 It started with a text: “[C]ramps coming n going, my cycle is changing completely due to 
all the stress I been under lately so not sure when my period is coming but still feeling the 
pain[.]”2 That initial text was sent by Purvi Patel to her friend, Felicia “Fay” Turnbo on April 15, 
2013. Over the next couple months, Patel continued to text Turnbo, a medical assistant, about her 
concerns. Patel mentioned she had been spotting and cramping for two months at this point but 
thought it was due to stress. About a month later, she was still experiencing cramping but 
mentioned that her period wouldn’t start. When Turnbo told Patel she should see a doctor, Patel 
texted back, “[D]on’t like docs lol! I think [the cramping]’s cuz of all the stress my body been 
goin thru physically n mentally[.]” Two weeks later, Patel texted Turnbo that she thought she 
might be pregnant but hoped not. Another week passed, and Patel took a pregnancy test that took 
“less than a minute” to show a positive result. Turnbo again encouraged Patel to go see a doctor, 
but Patel protested, texting, “I rather not even go to a doc…just wanna get it over with[.]” 
 While Turnbo continued to tell Patel she should see a doctor, Patel instead was 
researching solutions online to end her pregnancy. Turnbo suggested she go to a clinic in South 
Bend that had “the pill for that” for “300-400 [dollars] or something like that.” Patel responded, 
saying “But it’s only within 60 days…I might be over that[.]” Later that day, she went online and 
                                                          
2 This paper references text messages between Purvi Patel and Felicia “Fay” Turnbo; for the full copy of the appeal 
document that outlines a majority of these texts, visit this webpage: 
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/07221601tac.pdf (Purvi Patel v. State of Indiana, 2015). 
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ordered mifepristone and misoprostol3 from a pharmacy in Hong Kong for a total of $72. Patel 
texted Turnbo about how she wanted the father of the child as well as the child “outta [her] 
life[.]” The father was a married employee of the restaurant Patel managed, Moe’s (Purvi Patel 
v. State of Indiana, 2015). On July 1st, Patel texted that her “package came,” but she waited until 
July 10th to start the process of taking the drugs because of a conference in Chicago she had to 
attend.  
 From July 11 to the 13, Patel texted Turnbo saying that she had been experiencing intense 
cramps and intermittent bleeding. By the 13th, Patel told Turnbo she was trying to go to the 
hospital “but [couldn’t] get off the bed to get dressed[.]” Turnbo told Patel that Patel needed to 
get to a hospital and asked if she was going to go. Patel replied, “Want to but can’t drive.” About 
30 minutes later, Patel texted Turnbo saying “Just lost the baby” and shortly after, “Imma clean 
up my bathroom floor n then go to Moes[.]” Patel told Turnbo that the fetus was “starting to 
form a lil,” but it was in actuality close to a foot long and a little less than a pound and a half 
(Purvi Patel v. State of Indiana, 2015). Patel cut the umbilical cord, which caused the fetus to 
bleed out4, placed it in a plastic bag and left it in the dumpster behind Moe’s, and drove herself 
to the hospital.  
 When Patel arrived at the hospital, the doctors found a part of the umbilical cord hanging 
out of her vagina, the placenta attached to her uterine wall, and her uterus filled with blood. 
                                                          
3 Misoprostol is generally used to decrease the risk of stomach ulcers, but side effects for pregnant women include 
spontaneous abortion, birth defects, or premature birth (Misoprostol, 2017). Mifepristone is solely used to end a 
pregnancy. It works by blocking progesterone, which is necessary for pregnancy to continue (Mifepristone, 2017). 
In order to induce a miscarriage, the pregnant woman is to take the mifepristone first, then 24-48 hours later, take 
the misoprostol. The whole process may take up to 15 days and bleeding can last up to 3 weeks (Mifepristone and 
Misoprostol, n.d.). 
4 The fetus was drained of virtually all blood due to the cutting of the umbilical cord, but this was not necessarily the 
cause of “death.” The evidence remains inconclusive as to whether the fetus was “born alive,” (Purvi Patel v. State 
of Indiana, 2015). 
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Based on the size of the umbilical cord and the placenta, doctors estimated there must have been 
a baby and that it potentially might have been far enough along to still be alive. Patel ended up 
telling police where the fetus was located. Atypically, her doctor left the hospital to participate in 
the search along with the police. They eventually found the fetus and arrested Patel for child 
neglect, later adding the charge of feticide. After facing a jury in court, Patel was convicted on 
both counts. She spent over a year in jail before she was able to appeal her case, have her 
conviction overturned, and be released from jail. 
 The details of Patel’s case show a lack of trust in the medical system, which is common 
among people of color. This lack of trust is not without reason, as her doctor was the person who 
reported her to the authorities. Patel’s case and the language in the pro-Patel legal documents is 
something I will address extensively in the analysis. First, however, I set up the literature 
relevant to Patel’s case. I give a historical background to the politics of reproduction and the 
history of criminalization of pregnant women of color, restrictions on reproductive choice, fetal 
personhood, and feticide statutes, as relevant to Purvi Patel and my analysis of the pro-Patel 
documents of her case. 
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CHRONOLOGY OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 
 My argument analyzes Patel’s case from legal and historical perspectives, investigating 
how women of color have historically been criminalized for their actions during pregnancy. This 
literature review begins by introducing the New Right in the Reagan era, which sets the 
background for crack mothers as criminalized pregnant women of color. In response to the 
feminist gains achieved in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States saw a new conservative 
resurgence in the form of the New Right, a group whose goals were systematically to roll back 
women’s reproductive rights, specifically to reverse Roe v. Wade (1973). I continue by 
discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), hereafter referred 
to as Casey, which in 1992, changed Roe v. Wade’s trimester framework for restricting abortion 
to the “undue burden” model (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
1992; Roe v. Wade, 1973), upon which all TRAP laws are founded. TRAP laws, or targeted 
regulation of abortion providers, have been the conservative political tool of choice for testing 
the court’s tolerance for “undue burden” at the state level since Casey. Of particular interest in 
the present study are TRAP laws that establish the fetus as having the same rights as a person, 
also known as fetal personhood. If conservative anti-abortion activists, including elected state 
legislators, can argue that a fetus is a person, then it is a small step to charging a woman who 
aborts with feticide. Indeed, the 2004 Federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act, enacted under 
the George W. Bush administration, served to afford personhood to fetuses even at the moment 
of conception, all under the guise of protecting pregnant women. This idea of protecting the 
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health of pregnant women has also been an anti-abortion strategy for enacting TRAP laws that 
restrict access to reproductive healthcare beyond abortion. Any restriction to healthcare 
disproportionally affects women in poverty, who are overrepresented by women of color. 
Viewed from a Reproductive Justice framework, then, Purvi Patel’s case exemplifies the 
intersection of women of color’s bodies with the state’s intervention into women’s reproductive 
freedoms. 
 
The New Right and Reagan Reproductive Politics 
 As women began to gain ground with more progressive policies, primarily the approval 
by Congress of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 as well as the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision to legalize abortion, the United States faced a resurgence of regressive ideology put 
forth by the so-called neo-conservatives or New Right (Faludi, 1991). This was a group of 
religious individuals, many of whom were “rural fundamentalist ministers” with decreasing 
congregations who saw themselves not as defenders of a current way of life but as reviving a 
past one (Faludi, 1991, p. 230-231). The New Right saw the “feminist agenda” as a direct threat 
to their sense of power in society and attributed various social ills, including a struggling 
economy and falling international reputation, to the “liberal-progressive moral decay” 
(Golombisky, 2006, p. 104). The New Right then framed their political aims and strategies as a 
response to the perceived successes of feminists (Faludi, 1991). A main result of their impact on 
the Republican Party during the 1980 election was transforming their platform to include 
opposition to the ERA and legal abortion. Ronald Reagan, the chosen Republican candidate, was 
the first president to oppose the ERA since its passing by Congress and the first to support a total 
abortion ban, which even included some types of birth control (Faludi, 1991, p. 236).   
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  The New Right’s rhetorical strategy cloaked its discomfort and distrust of women’s 
movements and feminists in a language that romanticized an idealized white patriarchal past and 
nuclear family that never existed. With a slight linguistic change, the New Right purported to be 
pro-life, pro-family, pro-chastity, and pro-motherhood, instead of anti-women’s liberation 
(Faludi, 1991). Changing the language was a successful marketing technique that painted 
conservatives as more than a “backlash.” As Faludi (1991) wrote, “Now [they were] in charge—
and the feminists would have to react to [their] program,” (p. 238). However, during that period, 
their real agenda became apparent as supporters of the New Right “torched inhabited family-
planning clinics,” and neo-conservative politicians opposed nearly every federal assistance 
program that was meant to serve mothers, “from prenatal services to infant feeding programs,” 
(Faludi, 1991, p. 239).  
 A major reason for the opposition to federal assistance programs was the trope of the 
“welfare queen,” an image in the mainstream white American imagination of a Black mother on 
welfare who intentionally reproduces over and over in order to increase her monthly allotment 
from the federal government (Hill Collins, 2000). This cultural image is a powerful one: Roberts 
(1997) notes, “A 1990 study found that 78 percent of white Americans thought that Blacks 
preferred to live on welfare” (p. 17). The image of the welfare queen is synonymous with an 
image of Black hyperfertility and a “culture of poverty” (Roberts, 1997, p. 18). In the white 
political narrative, the children so-called welfare queen births do not inherit a work ethic and 
thus do not become productive members of society. Poverty, drug use, unemployment, and other 
social ills that impact Black families at disproportionate rates, are all her fault, rather than the 
fault of policies that systematically oppress Black people (Roberts, 1997). This “controlling 
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image” (Hill Collins, 2000) is closely tied to and interconnected with crack mothers, another 
stereotype of Black women that blames them for the social ills that plague their communities.  
 
Crack Mothers 
 In the years of the Reagan presidency and neo-conservatism, mainstream news outlets 
began focusing on a “new drug epidemic” sweeping the nation: crack cocaine. This drug was an 
easy way to “legally” target and persecute Black Americans, as its use was primarily restricted to 
inner cities (Roberts, 1997). It was also particularly suited to the criminalization of Black 
women, as “approximately half of the nation’s crack smokers are female,” (Roberts, 1997, p. 
155). Many of these women addicted to crack were pregnant or of childbearing age (Roberts, 
1997). It is noteworthy, then, that crack and powder cocaine (more known for use among 
wealthier white people) had a 100-to-1 sentencing disparity until 2010’s Fair Sentencing Act, 
which reduced the disparity to 18-to-1 ("The Fair Sentencing Act corrects a long-time wrong in 
cocaine cases,” 2010, Fair Sentencing Act, 2010). In other words, prior to 2010, five grams of 
crack carried the same 5-year federally mandated obligatory sentence as 500 grams of powder 
cocaine (Vagins & McCurdy, 2006). Additionally, some laws specifically targeted pregnant 
women: “[I]n the early 1990s the justice system stepped in and attempted to criminalize drug use 
during pregnancy…A drug-using pregnant woman faced arrest and potential incarceration for 
delivering drugs to a minor,” (Murphy & Rosenbaum, 1999, p. 11). Using drug transportation 
laws against pregnant women was a legal way to punish them, mainly women of color who were 
addicted to crack, for exercising their reproductive freedom to become pregnant.    
 By 1999, Boyd wrote that “regulation focusing on cocaine use emerged in the 1980s,” 
and that “legal sanctions against maternal drug use [in the United States] have been initiated by 
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thirty states since the mid-1980s” (p. 25). Of the women arrested for violations of these statutes, 
most of them were taken in “based on ‘allegations’ of illicit drug use during pregnancy” (Boyd, 
1999, p. 26). Moreover, these women were prosecuted under statutes not meant to be used for 
pregnant women using drugs, such as “distributing drugs to a minor, child abuse and neglect, 
reckless endangerment, manslaughter, and assault with a deadly weapon,” (Roberts, 1997, p. 
153). Much like Purvi Patel, “many of these cases involve doctors who contacted legal 
authorities about the mothers’ suspected illicit drug use” (Boyd, 1999, p. 26). Though individual 
intentions of the doctors cannot be known, it is noteworthy that women of color are 
disproportionally reported to authorities by their doctors. Today, documentary director Tamarkin 
(2017) suggests the rise of faith-based hospitals increases a woman’s risk of being reported to 
police for being suspected of harming their fetus, without the woman’s knowledge or consent. 
This practice results in not only another form of social control in the lives and reproduction of 
women of color in the United States, but also draws in legal issues of privacy, particularly with 
regard to doctor-patient confidentiality. Purvi Patel drove herself to a faith-based hospital, but 
most of the hospitals in her area were faith-based, as she worked five minutes away from a major 
Catholic university, Notre Dame.   
 Humphries (1999) writes that the statistics suggesting Black women’s use of 
drugs/cocaine during pregnancy are higher than white women’s might be inaccurate due to the 
fact that “private physicians would have hesitated to alienate their patients—who were 
disproportionally white—by reporting their drug use to health authorities” (Humphries, 1999, p. 
51). This is very different from Patel’s case and other cases regarding women of color being 
reported by their doctors for their alleged mistreatment of their fetuses (Boyd, 1999). Later, I 
argue that the practice of reporting patients to authorities constitutes a violation of privacy, 
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particularly in Patel’s case, as the doctors freely offered information to law enforcement without 
Patel’s consent or a subpoena.  
 
Surveillance, Mother Blame, and the “Bad Mother” 
 The violation of Patel’s right to medical privacy is directly related to the surveillance 
women of color face in their everyday lives. Women of color and impoverished women are more 
likely to experience more surveillance in their lives in the form of social systems, like the 
healthcare system and the criminal legal system, as well as by empowered individual actors, like 
doctors, social workers, and parole officers. This effect is compounded when women are 
pregnant. Johnson (2000) explains that for pregnant women, anyone, including friends, family, 
and strangers, is permitted to surveil the pregnant woman’s everyday behaviors and actions. This 
surveillance creates a system of social control in the pregnant woman’s life: “As medicine and 
psychology document the importance of prenatal experience, a pregnant woman's actions come 
under closer and closer scrutiny; as these scientific discourses become widely known, they 
adhere to efforts by the state to control women's actions” (p. 174). 
 One result of this surveillance is the creation and promotion of an ideal picture of a 
“Good Mother,” as directly contrasted with the idea of what makes a “Bad Mother” (Hughes 
Miller, Hager, & Jaremko Bromwich, 2017). The Good Mother always puts her children before 
herself, is endlessly supportive and caring, and as a cultural motif, is not really ever achievable. 
The Bad Mother can be many things, but generally serves the purpose of shaming and 
controlling women’s reproductive decisions. The authors argue, however, that both tropes are 
used for surveillance and social control of women. A related tactic of control is blaming mothers 
for virtually anything that goes wrong with their children. Mother blame is a theme in Patel’s 
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case as well, which I will discuss in more detail later in my analysis. In Patel’s case, mother 
blame manifests itself in arguments that Patel had a responsibility to save her fetus, even as 
Patel’s own health at the time was severe enough to seek emergency medical attention leading to 
emergency surgery. Hughes Miller, Hager, and Jaremko Bromwich (2017) explain the 
intersection of mother blame, the Bad Mother, and surveillance: “Mother blame is frequently the 
mechanism by which the Bad Mother trope is applied…which requires a surveillance culture 
within which such assessments [of harm/risk] can arise along with individual ‘experts’ willing to 
designate such behaviors as risky or harmful” (p. 8). This culture of surveilling women 
contributes to a culture in which women, and primarily women who are already seen as “Bad 
Mothers,” can be criminalized for their reproductive actions.  
 
Criminalizations of Pregnant Women and Mothers, Pre-Patel 
 Though Patel was the first to be convicted under a feticide mandate in the United States, 
there are many other women who were targeted and prosecuted for actions related to their 
pregnancies under different statutes. A report by Amnesty International about criminalized 
pregnancy noted there are two forms of criminalization: direct and indirect. Direct 
criminalization refers to laws that explicitly criminalize pregnancy, such as Tennessee’s 2014 
amendment to its fetal assault law, where legislators explicitly made women vulnerable to 
prosecution for “any unlawful act” with regards to their own fetuses (Amnesty International, 
2017, p. 7). Indirect criminalization refers to laws that do not explicitly criminalize pregnancy 
but are nevertheless used against pregnant women to regulate their reproductive decisions, such 
as Indiana’s feticide law (Amnesty International, 2017). A study conducted by Paltrow and 
Flavin (2013) reported on 413 cases of criminalized pregnancy between the years of 1973 and 
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2005, which they noted was likely an undercount due to the difficulty of searching criminal 
databases for criminalized pregnancy, confidentiality in cases of minors, lack of records about 
Native American tribal courts, and lack of media coverage of some cases. They detail several 
cases that they claim to be illustrative of the variety of ways in which women are criminalized.  
 In the first case that they name, a 21-year-old African American woman in South 
Carolina, Regina McKnight, suffered a stillbirth as a result of an infection. Prosecutors alleged 
that she caused the infection from her cocaine use and she was charged with homicide by child 
abuse. After 15 minutes of deliberation, the jury returned with a guilty verdict, though her 
conviction was eventually overturned in 2008 after she had served eight years of her 12-year 
sentence (Paltrow & Flavin, 2013). In another case, a Native American woman, Martina 
Greywind, was only 12 weeks pregnant when she was arrested in 1992 for reckless 
endangerment on the basis of subjecting her fetus to danger by inhaling paint fumes. Greywind, a 
28-year-old homeless woman in North Dakota, was able to be released from jail in order to 
attend a medical appointment, where she obtained an abortion and subsequently filed for 
dismissal. The case was dismissed as requested, with the prosecutor reportedly stating it was “no 
longer worth the time or expense to prosecute her” (Paltrow & Flavin, 2013, p. 308). These are 
two examples of the types of cases Paltrow and Flavin analyzed in their 2013 study of 
criminalized pregnancies that demonstrate the varieties of ways in which women are forced, 
coerced, or otherwise stripped of their reproductive agency. In McKnight’s case, she spent 8 
years in prison for an infection based on the assumption that the infection was as a result of drug 
use. In Greywind’s case, the prosecution threatened her with criminal charges and caused her to 
obtain an abortion in order to avoid prison.  
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 Not explicitly mentioned in Paltrow and Flavin’s study, Jennifer Johnson was another 
noteworthy case of the criminalization of pregnancy. Johnson, a Black woman, was charged with 
delivering drugs to a minor after “pass[ing] cocaine to her newborn child through the umbilical 
cord after the baby was delivered, but before the cord was cut” (Feinman, 1992, p. 204). She was 
convicted and sentenced to “fifteen to twenty-four years probation, mandatory drug 
rehabilitation, drug and alcohol prohibitions, [and required to] report subsequent pregnancies to 
her probation officer and to enter a court-approved prenatal care program” (Feinman, 1992, p. 
204). Johnson’s case is significant as it demonstrates how pregnancy is used to criminalize a 
woman’s actions. It also highlights the racist propensity to target women of color and restrict 
their ability to have children as they choose. Johnson’s case also demonstrates how non-law 
enforcement sometimes is complicit in the criminalization of pregnant women. Humphries 
(1999) notes that “a social worker had violated patient confidentiality and turned over Johnson’s 
medical file to Seminole County prosecutors” (p. 76). All this shows how various actors surveil 
pregnant bodies and contribute to their criminalizations. The fact that Johnson was also required 
to report future pregnancies to her probation officer represents a prime example of the 
surveillance involved in managing pregnant bodies. 
 Bei Bei Shuai’s criminalization is perhaps the most relevant to Patel’s case as Shuai’s 
case directly preceded Patel’s and also took place in Indiana. Shuai was 33 weeks pregnant when 
she ingested rat poison in an attempted suicide (B.S. v. State of Indiana, 2012). Her suicide was 
not successful, and she was taken to the hospital by a friend, where she underwent an emergency 
caesarian section. The infant was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit where it later 
perished. Shuai was charged with murder and attempted feticide on March 14, 2011 (B.S. v. State 
of Indiana, 2012). However, she was offered and accepted a plea deal for criminal recklessness 
17 
 
in 2013 (Penner, 2013). Because Shuai’s case was widely publicized, it is not a stretch to suggest 
Patel might have been aware of Shuai’s case. Regardless, Patel’s criminalization in Indiana must 
be interpreted against the backdrop of Shuai’s criminalization.   
 
Abortion Rights, Undue Burden, and TRAP Laws 
 While the conservative movement was arguing for “family values” for white families and 
rolling back public assistance for “welfare queens,” they were also systematically enacting state 
laws to test the courts’ willingness to define “undue burden” in terms of access to abortion. In 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, the Supreme Court justices established a three-trimester approach to 
regulating abortion, with the third trimester allowing the most state regulation and the first 
trimester allowing no state intervention in access to abortion (Medoff, 2010). However, in a 1992 
decision, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court 
adjusted its previous decision, rejecting the trimester framework and instead adopting a “no 
undue burden” policy on abortion restrictions (Medoff, 2010). Undue burden refers to a 
“substantial obstacle” placed in a woman’s path to obtaining an abortion (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992). Though Casey made it national law that no “undue 
burdens” could be placed on the accessibility of abortion, this Supreme Court decision, as well as 
Roe v. Wade, had varying impacts on communities of color than on white communities. 
Meanwhile, in 1977, the Hyde Amendment that banned, and later restricted, federal funds for 
abortion went into effect, as a result of early anti-abortion conservative politics. In practice, this 
Amendment meant that working class women who depended on Medicaid were unable to access 
abortion without paying out of pocket. TRAP laws, then, under the pretense of concern “for the 
health of the mother,” purposively and systematically function to restrict access to abortion in 
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order to test the courts’ willingness to draw a line defining “undue burden” on those seeking 
abortion. 
 Prior to Roe v. Wade, women without means to legal abortion often would attempt to 
self-abort if they chose not to proceed with the pregnancy. Nelson (2003) lists some methods 
women used to self-abort, including intentionally falling down flights of stairs, hitting oneself in 
the stomach, consuming poisonous substances, or inserting objects into the uterus that were toxic 
or piercing (p.9). She notes, “Some of these women arrived at the hospital emergency room 
bleeding profusely hoping that a physician would complete the procedure” (Nelson, 2003, p. 9). 
While Roe v. Wade improved these conditions by making legal abortion more accessible, women 
of color and women in poverty are still often in a position where they do not have access to safe 
abortions due to TRAP (targeted regulation of abortion providers) laws.  
 Since Roe v. Wade, conservative lawmakers and special interest groups have organized to 
systematically roll back access to abortion until it is virtually inaccessible by proposing extreme 
and often irrelevant restrictions on abortion and those who provide it. These restrictions are 
referred to as TRAP laws and can mean anything from dictating the width of the hallways in 
abortion clinics and requiring doctors have privileges at a local hospital to mandating waiting 
periods of several days for women who wish to have abortions. The most common TRAP laws 
are those that: refuse to fund abortion for working class women on Medicaid, require minors 
(under 18) to involve their parents in their pregnancy decision, demand a waiting period of 24 
hours or longer to have an abortion, and compel doctors to “counsel” their patients about the 
risks of abortion (often using knowingly inaccurate information) (Medoff, 2009).  
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 TRAP laws often appear to be unimportant or mundane but are, in actuality, closing the 
doors of abortion providers at shocking rates. Medoff (2009) studied the effects of TRAP laws 
on abortion providers and found that states with TRAP laws saw a statistically significant 
increase in closures of abortion providers as opposed to those without TRAP laws. As more 
abortion providers have to close their doors, fewer people have access to abortion, as they can 
end up having to travel significant distances, even across state lines, to access a clinic, something 
many women, particularly women with limited means, cannot afford to do. This is especially 
problematic where mandatory waiting periods are law because women might have to take off 
multiple days of work, creating even greater barriers to accessing a safe and legal abortion 
(Porter, 2016). 
 Agostinone-Wilson (2014) lists some examples of laws, some passed and some not, that 
utilize this restrictive strategy, including, for example, laws that require women: to view 
ultrasound images of their wombs before an abortion, receive transvaginal ultrasounds, and listen 
to doctors give inaccurate information about the so-called dangers of abortion, among others. 
Bills that outlaw contraception as well as abortion have also been proposed claiming that 
fertilized eggs are people, thus awarding complete personhood to these beings yet to become, 
often at the expense of the pregnant woman rather than protecting her. These laws are 
unnecessarily restrictive, as none of these are medically necessary and the cost of following these 
rules can be prohibitive for lower-income women to obtain an abortion. The laws can also be 
traumatic for some women, as it is not medically necessary to require women to have 
ultrasounds, particularly invasive transvaginal ultrasounds, which can be distressing for women 
who have been victims of sexual assault (Agostinone-Wilson, 2014).  
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 In Indiana, legislators proposed and passed particularly troublesome, and I would argue 
punitive, restrictions to abortion, for example: “an...ultrasound bill that would require women to 
receive two trans-vaginal probes (before and after) in order to receive the RU-486 pill5... The use 
of probes is medically irrelevant since a blood test could verify that a pregnancy had been ended” 
(Agostinone-Wilson, 2014, p. 21). Since Patel’s case, Indiana senators proposed and passed 
HEA 1337 in March of 2016. This law included many unreasonable restrictions, including (but 
not limited to): requiring fetuses lost as a result of abortion or miscarriage to be buried or 
cremated; prohibiting abortion based on race, sex, national origin, etc., of the fetus; and 
mandating an 18-hour waiting period between initial consultation (in which the doctor is 
required to inform the patient of alternative options to abortion as well as to offer the patient the 
option to see an ultrasound or hear the fetus’s heartbeat) and actual appointment for the abortion 
(House Bill 1337, 2016). Despite its passing, HEA 1337 was halted by a federal judge before it 
could take effect (Wang, 2016). On January 9th, 2017, an Indiana legislator, Republican Rep. 
Curt Nisly, proposed a total abortion ban, including in cases of rape, incest, and maternal health 
risk, though it failed to pass because Republican Rep. Ben Smaltz, the chair of the House 
Committee of Public Policy, turned it down for a hearing (Indiana 'Protection of Life' Bill, 2017; 
Cox, 2017). Even after Patel’s exoneration, Indiana’s legislators continue to test “undue burden.”  
 Previously a Ku Klux Klan hub, Indiana has never been a very progressive state. 
Indiana’s laws, courts, and constitution placed people of color in a “separate but unequal place” 
(Bodenhamer & Shepard, 2006, p. 40). Governor Mitch Daniels was Indiana’s predecessor to 
Governor Mike Pence, who was the governor in Indiana at the time of Patel’s criminalization. As 
governor, Daniels mostly promoted “budget cuts,” including slashing federal funding for 
                                                          
5 The RU-486 pill is mifepristone. 
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Planned Parenthood and privatizing welfare (LoBianco, 2013). Daniels’ cuts, often against the 
interests of financially insecure Indiana citizens, set the stage for an even more socially 
conservative governor who would go on to pass a host of mandates that negatively impacted the 
lives of Indiana residents. Pence passed a religious freedom mandate that allowed companies to 
refuse service based on “religious beliefs” (Phillips, 2016). He blocked needle exchange 
programs that could have ameliorated an HIV outbreak in 2014 due to a “moral opposition” to 
such programs (Twohey, 2016). He also signed eight anti-abortion bills into law in his four years 
as governor (Berg, 2016). His actions as governor certainly also affected the political climate 
during Patel’s case.   
 
Medical Abuse of Women of Color 
Patel mentioned to Turnbo multiple times in their text conversation that Patel did not like 
doctors and did not want to go to the doctor. This attitude is consistent with many people of 
color, who have a long history of abuse by the medical community. Perhaps most notorious, the 
Tuskegee Syphilis experiment was a 40-year study that “involved the intentional deception and 
denial of treatment of the research subjects” who were all Black men (Brandon, Isaac, and 
LaVeist, 2005, p. 951). Impoverished Black sharecroppers in Alabama were infected with 
syphilis and told they were being treated when actually the doctors were not treating them; 
instead they were watching the disease progress and performing autopsies when the men died 
(Washington, 2008).This experiment is the most infamous, but it is important to note that racial 
discrimination in medical care continues today, and the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment is not the 
only reason people of color do not trust medical professionals. Washington writes in Medical 
Apartheid: “[I]t is a mistake to attribute African Americans’ medical reluctance to simple fear 
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generated by the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, because this study is not an aberration that single-
handedly transformed African American perceptions of the health-care system. The study is part 
of a pattern of experimental abuse…” (2008).  
Included in that pattern of abuse is the story of Henrietta Lacks, a working-class Black 
woman who was diagnosed with cervical cancer in 1951. She had a tumor on her cervix that 
grew exponentially in the last months of her life. Lacks’ cells, called HeLa cells, were unique in 
that, provided they had food and warmth, they could survive and reproduce at high rates, as 
opposed to other cells that would frequently die hours or days after taking a sample. Doctors 
took a sample of the cancerous tissue without her knowledge and these cells continue to be used 
for scientific research today. HeLa cells have transformed science and medicine; Skloot’s (2010) 
book about Lacks explains: “The reason Henrietta’s cells were so precious was because they 
allowed scientists to perform experiments that would have been impossible with a living human. 
They cut HeLa cells apart and exposed them to endless toxins, radiation, and infections” (p. 58) 
The scientists’ supplies of HeLa cells were unlimited and generated an “incalculable amount of 
money” (Axelrod, 2010). And they continue to make money; as Skloot (2010) notes, “If the cells 
died in the process, it didn’t matter—scientists could just go back to their eternally growing 
HeLa stock and start over again” (p. 58).   
Despite the revolutionary scientific progress using HeLa cells and the amount of money 
generated from her cells, her family still has not seen any profits and cannot afford health 
insurance. Lacks’ story epitomizes the power imbalances and betrayals of trust women of color 
experience in their encounters with the medical system. Additionally, while there is no literature 
explicitly about Indian American women and their experiences with doctors, brown women 
certainly experience racial discrimination, and it is not a stretch to suggest that Purvi Patel’s 
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racialization contributed to her resistance to going to a doctor. In fact, a 2017 report from the 
National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum concludes that Asian American and Pacific 
Islander (AAPI) populations lack trust for medical providers: “Moreover, increased 
criminalization, detention, and deportation of immigrants over the past decade have created fear 
and distrust within AAPI immigrant communities, resulting in reduced access to health care” (p. 
16). 
 
Fetal Personhood 
 Patel, in addition to being charged with feticide, was also convicted of child abuse, a 
record that was not overturned in her appeal. I will deal with the contradiction of abusing a child 
that died of feticide in my analysis. At present, however, the possibility that Patel could be 
charged with child abuse of a fetus segues to the concept of fetal personhood, which refers to the 
idea that fetuses are individual human entities, separate from the pregnant woman. Fetal imagery 
technology has strengthened this idea. Anti-abortion activists made use of fetal sonograms to 
shift abortion rhetoric much like the linguistic tactic of using “pro” in pro-life used by the New 
Right to alter public opinion. By using the developing technology to capture these fetal images, 
anti-abortion activists were able to shift the way in which people talked about abortion from an 
abstract medical condition to “a baby.” As Sasson and Law (2009) write, “Imaging (and 
subsequently imagining) the fetus in this context leads to very strong, easily manipulated 
emotive responses” (p. 5). Petchesky (1987) emphasizes that the United States is a visually-
oriented culture, and as such, with the use of fetal sonograms and often graphic images of 
aborted or miscarried tissue, anti-choice activists switched their focus from legal discourses to a 
“more long-term ideological struggle” over the symbolism and meaning of a fetus.  
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 Before fetal sonograms became commonplace, the fetus was located in the imagination, 
unable to be seen. Fetal sonograms created a picture in which the uterus, the home of the fetus, 
was imagined as separate from the pregnant woman: “So long as the fetus is not “seen” or 
visually emphasized, it remains a liminal, transient, and obscure entity,” as an incomplete being. 
(Sasson & Law, 2009, p.5) This separation often made it possible to visualize the interests of the 
pregnant woman as separate from the “interests” of the fetus. Oaks (2000) argues: “Images of the 
fetus as autonomous threaten to overshadow the significance of pregnant women's bodies in the 
reproductive process, devalue the relationship between pregnant women and their fetuses, and 
represent women as adversaries of their babies-to-be” (p. 63-64). When women are represented 
as an “adversary” to their fetus, one result is the personification of the fetus, often at the expense 
of the pregnant woman’s interests. As Sasson and Law (2009) write: 
 By visually imaging the fetus, however, be it in vivid color on the cover  
 of Life magazine, in a hazy grayscale sonography printout fawned over by expectant  
 parents, or in manipulated images produced by antiabortion activists, one easily 
 concludes that it exists independently, as a being already become. (p. 5) 
 Personifying the fetus in this visual manner has legal implications. As previously noted, 
anti-choice activists used these images to pass new restrictions on reproductive laws. These 
include anti-abortion laws and restrictions, as well as laws regarding drug use while pregnant and 
feticide laws. In these cases, the fetus is usually legally regarded as a child. Some note this 
practice is a legal “slippery slope,” as it sets a precedent for fetuses to be regarded as a child 
under the law in other cases, perhaps even abortion statutes (Mahan, 1996, p. 38). Mahan (1996) 
goes on to describe fetal abuse laws intended to criminalize the woman carrying the fetus. These 
laws, in addition to affording the fetus personhood, are problematic because they paint the 
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pregnant woman as a danger to her fetus. This idea of “mothering” as dangerous, risky, or 
against the interests of a fetus plays into the “Bad Mother” trope, which serves to constrain 
women’s freedom to make parental choices (Hughes Miller, Hager, & Bromwich, 2017). The 
“Bad Mother” trope, such as the myth of “crack mothers,” justifies state intervention for the 
protection of the “child.” In Patel’s case, that intervention led to a charge of child abuse on a 
fetus. 
 While individual states are legislating fetal personhood, the courts have not been as 
persuaded in litigation. But, for feminist legal scholars, the legal flaw is that fetal personhood 
laws grant more rights to the fetus than the pregnant woman (Mahan, 1996, p. 39). The issue of 
whose rights are given more legal weight and privilege when fetuses are afforded personhood in 
general and in Patel’s case specifically is something I will address in more detail in my analysis 
and discussion.  
 
Feticide  
 Feticide laws were originally intended for pregnant women as an additional legal 
protection against violence. There are records of maternal protection laws as early as the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi6, throughout the 18th century BCE, that offer retribution for 
causing the loss of a pregnancy (Murphy, 2014). Throughout Western history, these laws have 
used the “born alive” rule, in which causing the loss of a pregnancy was sometimes punished but 
not generally considered homicide unless the child was “born alive.” With medical advances, 
however, some state legislators have argued that the “born alive” rule did not adequately punish 
violence against unborn fetuses. As more state legislators passed their own bills into laws 
                                                          
6 The code of Hammurabi is popularly understood as the oldest surviving law code, though some note it is closer to 
a penal code because most offenses have some form of penalty attached (Lyon, 1904). 
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prosecuting injury/death of a viable (able to live on its own, regardless of whether it was “born 
alive”) fetus as homicide, U.S. federal legislation proposed and passed the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act in 2004 (Murphy, 2014).  
 This law states that anyone causing the death of, or bodily injury to, “a child in utero” is 
guilty of a separate offense, in addition to the violence done to the “mother” of the “child” 
(Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 2004). This landmark Act created a federal mandate for 
feticide, as it established guidelines for dealing with violence that causes harm to a fetus, 
intentionally or unintentionally. Although it “officially” provides exemptions for abortion 
providers and other medical personnel as well as for the “mother” of the “child,” the language of 
the law is controversial. Specifically, the part that defines the term “unborn child” is troubling; 
the Act uses the term “unborn child” to refer to fetuses and notes that this includes fetuses “at 
any stage of development” (Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 2004). This language, like the 
visualization of the “baby” in the sonogram, is significant because it provides legislated legal 
precedent for personhood discourse from conception. In addition to referring to a fetus as a child, 
which, as mentioned previously, opens a legal avenue to characterize a fetus as a child under the 
law, it also affords the fetus the same right to bodily autonomy as the woman carrying it. The law 
states: “the punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under 
Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child’s mother” 
(Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 2004). This language sets precedent for other laws to place the 
legal rights of a fetus—again, at any stage of development—on par with the woman’s, thus 
affording the fetus total personhood. 
 Addressing the history of legal mandates and politics that restrict women’s freedom to 
choose if and when to have children is important for my analysis of the criminalizations of 
27 
 
women of color and of Purvi Patel. This historical context provides a necessary background for 
how fetal personhood became prevalent in abortion and feticide policies. Next, I introduce the 
frameworks that I use in my analysis of Patel’s case: feminist legal studies, intersectionality, and 
Reproductive Justice. 
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FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
JUSTICE 
 Working from a feminist legal studies methodology, I employ intersectionality 
(Crenshaw, 1989, 1991) and Reproductive Justice (Ross & Solinger, 2017; Silliman et al., 2004) 
as critical frameworks of analysis. Feminist legal studies allows me to approach the legal aspects 
of Patel’s case as well as the language used in her legal documents. Intersectionality allows me 
to look at the ways in which Patel’s interactions with institutional systems of power are 
racialized and gendered simultaneously. Reproductive Justice provides a framework for 
analyzing the ways in which Patel’s right to choose was constrained and encourages an approach 
that is historical as well as legal in my analysis of the criminalizations of women of color in 
general.  
 Feminist legal studies (FLS) critically analyzes the law and the implementation of the law 
through feminist perspectives. FLS particularly focuses on women and other marginalized 
groups and how the law affects them. Seeking to reform the law, FLS is as much academic as 
activist pursuit. Rooted in feminist theory, critical legal theory, and feminist jurisprudence, FLS 
as a field originated in the early 1970s. But because of the low number of women in the legal 
profession and the idea that sex discrimination was not a viable field of study, it did not become 
popular until the 1980s (Bartlett, 2012). One of the foundational scholars of feminist legal 
studies is Kimberlé Crenshaw, who is notable because she introduced an intersectional lens to 
FLS. Intersectionality is an important factor in my research as much of my analysis/discussion 
29 
 
will revolve around Patel’s racialized gender, both in the decisions that Patel made and her 
treatment by those with institutional and state power involved in her case. 
 In FLS, intersectionality as a framework asserts that individuals are treated differently 
based on their interlocking oppressions and identities. Specifically, women of color experience 
unique oppressions that are more than just racism and sexism added together. Their gender 
cannot be separated from their race, and their race cannot be separated from their gender. 
Crenshaw (1989) argues that these interlocking oppressions result in women of color being 
treated unfairly under the law (Crenshaw, 1989). Crenshaw’s work, while built from the specific 
cases of Black women, has been extended and applied to women of color who are not Black 
(Thornton Dill & Kohlman, 2012).  
 I argue that Patel’s racialized gender is part of what made her vulnerable to charges and 
ultimately a conviction for attempting her own abortion. It is noteworthy that the only other 
person to be charged for attempted feticide in the State of Indiana was also a woman of color. 
This case was the 2011-2013 case of Bei Bei Shuai, who was charged with murder and attempted 
feticide when she caused the death of her fetus while she was attempting her own suicide by 
ingesting rat poison. However, she was not convicted (Penner, 2013). Crenshaw, in 1991, 
extended her intersectional framework to other intersections of identity, such as class and 
sexuality (Crenshaw, 1991). Other intersections of identity can impact women’s treatment within 
the medical field, as well as under the law. For example, in terms of treatment in the medical 
field, a study about trans and gender nonconforming individuals and their experience with 
medical care reported 22% of transwomen said a doctor or other medical provider had refused 
them service due to their trans identity (Grant, et al., 2010). An example of improper treatment 
under the law is the New Jersey 4, a case in which four Black queer women were charged and 
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convicted for defending themselves against a man who was sexually harassing and intimidating 
them in Greenwich Village (Doroshwalther, 2014). Thus, Crenshaw’s intersectional analysis 
highlights the violence that the legal system perpetrates against women of color when they seek 
legal remedy for the violence they experience in society. 
 In the present study, feminist legal studies is useful because it allows me to look at laws 
regarding fetal harm in general and the consequences of these laws for women, and 
intersectionality is useful because it allows me to focus specifically on women of color. FLS also 
focuses on legal reform that provides space for a discussion on changes that can be made to 
address future cases of criminalized abortion or to avoid humanizing fetuses in the law 
altogether. Feminist legal scholars have given much attention to sex discrimination under the 
law: Lindgren and Taub (1993) note that women have historically been “severely restricted” by 
the law based on their sex (p. 47). Smith (1989) details three main ways that feminist legal 
studies can be conducted. The first approach seeks to eliminate gender differences in the law and 
enactments of the law. The second approach seeks to identify laws that appear gender neutral but 
affect women differently than men and then make special accommodations for that difference. 
The third approach, the approach I take in my analysis, disagrees with the notion that the law can 
ever be neutral or universal. It argues that the laws, and how they are formed, do not take 
women’s multiple perspectives into account (Smith, 1989). Attention to the ways in which the 
laws do or do not take discrimination against women into consideration is important in my 
research.  
 The Reproductive Justice Framework also argues that women’s multiple perspectives are 
not considered when creating policies that disproportionately affect women of color. Ross and 
Solinger (2017) define Reproductive Justice as “a contemporary framework for activism and for 
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thinking about the experience of reproduction” (p. 9). Reproductive Justice as a framework 
originated in 1983, following the first National Conference on Black Women’s Health Issues 
(Silliman et al., 2004). The conference led to the first organization specifically focused on 
reproductive justice for women of color, the National Black Women’s Health Project, which then 
spurred the creation of other organizations with a similar aim, such as the Native American 
Women’s Health Education Resource Center, Asians and Pacific Islanders for Reproductive 
Health, the National Latina Health Organization, and others (Silliman et al., 2004). These 
organizations are evidence of women of color leading a fight for their reproductive health. 
Recognizing their contributions is important as it resists pathologizing these women as helpless, 
which is a common problem when discussing the ways in which systems of patriarchy and 
racism constrict their choices. 
 Reproductive Justice is about more than just abortion and contraception. The 
Reproductive Justice Framework analyzes the various ways people of color are forced, coerced, 
and otherwise stripped of choice when it comes to the decision to have or not have a child, as 
well as how to be a parent (Ross & Solinger, 2017). These pressures often affect women of color 
in opposite ways from white women, as women of color more often have to fight structures of 
power and institutional practices such as forced sterilization in order to exercise their right to 
have children, while white women are often more interested in preserving the right to choose not 
to have children. This is not to say women of color are not interested in maintaining access to 
abortion and contraception, however. The Reproductive Justice Framework analyzes all the ways 
in which choice is constricted, particularly in the lives of women of color. Like feminist legal 
studies, Reproductive Justice is both an academic endeavor and an activist pursuit focused on 
analysis and effecting change. Ross and Solinger (2017) also note the importance of analysis in a 
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historical and legal context when analyzing the choices women make, a practice I strive to 
maintain here.  
 In this thesis, I use feminist legal studies, intersectionality, and Reproductive Justice to 
analyze the case of Purvi Patel. The criminalizations of other women of color contextualize and 
converge on the case of Purvi Patel. Next, I detail my process of analysis, which includes 
looking through the legal documents associated with Patel’s case and using the intersectional 
feminist legal studies method of “asking the woman question” (Bartlett, 2012, p. 405). 
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METHOD 
For the present purpose, I analyzed legal briefs speaking in support of Patel’s 
exoneration. These include briefs from Patel’s lawyers (appellant’s briefs) and special interest 
groups (amicus/amici curiae briefs). I had access to five briefs in support of Patel:  
 The appellant’s brief from October 2, 2015; 
 The brief of amici curiae from the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum and 
Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice at the University of California, Berkeley, 
School of Law also from October 2, 2015; 
 The amended brief of amicus curiae from the National Advocates for Pregnant Women 
and Experts in Public Health, Health Advocacy, and Bioethics from October 14, 2015;  
 The brief of amici curiae from the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, Amnesty 
International, and the Center for Reproductive Rights from November 20, 2015;  
 The appellant’s reply brief from January 12, 2016.  
These briefs come from political groups with particular political interests. As a result, 
these are not “neutral” court documents; these groups have political aims and these documents 
are political as well. The October 2nd amici curiae brief stated a vested interest in safeguarding 
and supporting “reproductive health, rights, and justice” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 5). The October 
14th brief was most interested in public health concerns (Patel v. State, 2015, pp. 4-5). The 
November 20th brief noted a particular concern for human rights issues (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 
7). Each brief had several pages of contributing organizations, too numerous to list here, so going 
forward, I will refer to each brief by the date of release. 
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I focused primarily on language present in these documents with an eye for legal and 
social implications. One strategy FLS uses is “asking the woman question” (Bartlett, 2012, p. 
405), which requires recognizing and contesting laws that erase or disadvantage women and their 
intersecting identities. This is a strategy I take in my analysis, asking how women, and 
particularly women of color (who may or may not be economically disadvantaged) and 
economically disadvantaged women (who may or may not be non-white women of color), are 
targeted by certain policies and how cases like Patel’s set a dangerous precedent for the 
persecution of women. Highlighting the experiences of women of color and economically 
disadvantaged women is critical to an intersectional analysis through a Reproductive Justice 
framework. It is important to note as well that there is a connection between women of color and 
disproportionate rates of poverty, which can affect the accessibility of healthcare services, 
insurance, and information (Roberts, 1997, p. 111). This connection leaves women of color with 
often constrained reproductive choices. 
Patel’s case is one battle in a war for reproductive rights nationwide. Analyzing the 
arguments of her proponents gives a glimpse into the legal tactics used to support women and 
counter threats to their reproductive rights. I chose to analyze the strategies used by Patel’s 
lawyers and political groups in support of Patel to determine how consistent these approaches are 
with FLS, Reproductive Justice, and intersectionality. Since these briefs have the potential to 
influence court decisions, I think it is important to note whether the language used reproduces or 
challenges systems of oppression. With that in mind, my process of analysis was to look for 
common or main themes within and between the briefs and particularly those that reinforce or 
challenge reproductive rights. I looked for words or phrases that were recurring or emphasized in 
the documents and made note of those common themes. I coded the themes that appeared as: 
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fetal personhood; racialized gender; medical privacy and trust; surveillance, knowledge, and 
legitimacy.  
Below, I analyze these briefs based on the first four themes listed above. I continue by 
discussing implications for human rights, public health, and the law. I argue that the briefs often 
reinforced systems of control that constrict reproductive choices, even as the Court of Appeals 
may have been swayed by their arguments to rule on behalf of Patel and release her.  
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ANALYSIS 
 This case was significant not just because Patel was charged and convicted with feticide, 
but also because Patel was convicted of contradictory charges: child neglect, which requires a 
live child, and feticide, which by definition is the killing of a fetus prior to birth. In prosecuting 
Patel for feticide, the State essentially made the victim out to be her fetus, granting it 
personhood. In the following section, I outline four themes from the briefs: fetal personhood; 
racialized gender; medical privacy and trust; and surveillance, knowledge, and legitimacy. I 
argue that the pro-Patel briefs often adopted language which personified Patel’s fetus, even while 
they assert the use of the feticide statute is improper. I show how the briefs sometimes 
acknowledged and sometimes ignored Patel’s racialized gender. I emphasize the problematic 
practice of medical professionals, and particularly Catholic healthcare systems, reporting their 
patients to authorities, as happened in Patel’s case, and the lack of attention this issue received in 
the briefs. Finally, I address the wider issue of the medical system and legal system intertwining 
to manage and surveil pregnant bodies and the reluctance of pro-Patel briefs to acknowledge this 
practice.  
I also argue that pro-Patel briefs were not always consistent with intersectionality and 
Reproductive Justice, even while they may have been effective in convincing the Court of 
Appeals to release Patel. For example, the November brief stated, “the vast majority of states in 
the US have refused to criminalize women for poor pregnancy outcomes,” which is, according to 
Paltrow and Flavin’s (2013) study, not true. Paltrow and Flavin’s study includes cases of 
criminalized pregnancy from 44 states. Oversimplifying these issues to frame Patel’s as a 
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completely unique case is problematic because it erases the many criminalizations of pregnant 
women of color in the United States. In the same brief, they state “laws regulating abortion 
historically sought to protect pregnant women from unsafe abortions,” which is another 
oversimplification of criminalized pregnancy and may benefit Patel’s case but undermines a long 
history of prosecuting and legislating pregnancy in order to control certain people. Next, in my 
discussion, I outline implications for human rights, public health, and legal precedence.  
 
Fetal Personhood 
 A core component of Patel’s case is the personification of her fetus. Feticide mandates, as 
previously discussed, were originally intended as an additional protection for pregnant women 
who suffered violence at the hands of a third party. The use of a feticide statute against a 
pregnant woman who is suspected of terminating her own pregnancy inherently prioritizes the 
potential life of the fetus over the decision of the woman and affords the fetus personhood that 
trumps the personhood of the woman. The pro-Patel briefs sometimes highlighted the language 
that afforded Patel’s fetus personhood in State documents and the courtroom, but often 
reinforced the same kind of language in their discussions of her case.  
A positive aspect of the briefs was the acknowledgement of language surrounding Patel’s 
fetus in the excerpts from the courtroom and State documents that afforded personhood to the 
fetus. As an example, the October 14th amici brief cited Dr. Prahlow’s7 testimony in which he 
said that “extreme prematurity” was the cause of death but that it was an “act of homicidal 
violence” that caused the extreme prematurity (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 8). The brief authors argue 
this testimony was inappropriate not only because actions prior to birth cannot be considered in 
neglect/abuse cases, as established in Herron v. State (2000), but also because the term 
                                                          
7 The State’s expert who performed an autopsy and decided that the fetus had taken at least one breath 
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“homicidal violence” portrays Patel as a villain. More importantly, such a characterization of 
Patel’s actions portrays the fetus as a person. The brief mainly notes that this language reinforces 
stigma about abortion but also mentions that it conflates abortion with homicide. Homicide is a 
term reserved for one person killing another person. The brief argues it is not and should not be 
synonymous with ending a pregnancy. Feticide similarly should not be used for abortion cases. 
The decision in Baird v. State (1992) asserted the Indiana feticide statute should not be used as 
an abortion law, and instead expanded the homicide law to include the “situation in which the 
victim is not a ‘human being…but a fetus’” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 17). The language of “the 
victim is not a ‘human being…but a fetus’” is noteworthy because the judges seem to reject the 
idea of the fetus as a human being, thus intentionally electing not to afford personhood to fetuses 
under Indiana law. The judges’ reluctance to grant personhood to the fetus in Baird v. State 
(1992) became a touch stone for the briefs and Patel’s lawyers. Baird v. State (1992) is 
referenced 18 times. 
 Conversely, the legal briefs in support of Patel also used the strategy of personifying the 
fetus and emphasizing fetal health, or at the very least neglecting to discuss the implications of 
feticide statutes. For example, in the first appellant brief, under the “statement of facts” section, 
Patel’s lawyers write, “Dr. McGuire opened the bag and found the body of a dead infant” (Patel 
v. State, 2015, p. 7). Later in the same brief, they write, “Hence, with heartbroken resignation to 
that deferential standard of review, the defendant is not asking this Court to review what she 
knows to be the profoundly mistaken finding of live birth” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 12). Patel’s 
defense contradicts its own argument by taking up the rhetoric of the State in referring to Patel’s 
fetus as a “dead infant” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 7). In doing so, Patel’s lawyers undermine their 
argument that Patel’s fetus was not born alive and effectively afford Patel’s fetus personhood. 
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 The use of fetal personhood in these briefs is likely strategic: Indiana, as mentioned 
previously, has a record of prioritizing fetal life over maternal life. This record was downplayed 
in the October 14th brief, which argued that Indiana has historically not prosecuted women for 
their abortions, even when abortion was a misdemeanor in the State of Indiana in 1881 (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 20). As noted by Paltrow and Flavin (2013), however, searching through court 
files to find evidence of criminalizations of pregnancies is difficult and likely not comprehensive, 
due to the challenges of searching through unindexed criminal databases, protecting minors’ 
identities, inaccessible records in cases of Native American tribal courts, and lack of media 
coverage. Thus, it is within the realm of possibility that finding no evidence of criminalizations 
of pregnancy is actually evidence of a deeper history of criminalizing pregnancy in the State of 
Indiana. While Indiana’s record for prioritizing fetal life was downplayed in one brief, the 
January appellant brief highlighted it: “The point is that Indiana has decided not to prosecute 
women for their abortions and this decision is entirely consistent with Indiana’s steadfast 
commitment to protecting fetal life” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 9). Patel’s lawyers, rather than 
underscoring the legal right to abortion if women so choose, stress fetal life again, which is likely 
strategic as they know fetal life is historically prioritized over women’s rights.  
 In the briefs, the emphasis on fetal life had an impact on the (lack of) emphasis on 
maternal life. As fetal life was underlined, maternal life was downplayed. For example, in the 
January appellant brief, Patel’s lawyers discuss the implications of criminalizing pregnancy by 
noting “women will for fear of being wrongly or rightly accused of self-abortion, avoid seeking 
treatment that might well save the fetus and/or the woman’s life” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 9). This 
language of “fetus and/or woman” separates the fetus from the woman, which is problematic as it 
reinforces the idea that a fetus is its own person able to live on its own separate from the 
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pregnant woman. This excerpt implies the fetus and the pregnant woman are two separate 
entities, but also listing the fetus’s life first literally makes the woman’s life an afterthought, 
rather than the main concern for public health, as some briefs argue it should be. As the 
November brief notes, “Any regulation or restriction to protect a fetus will inevitably interfere 
with a pregnant woman’s ability to control her body and health and to make autonomous 
decisions about her life” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 7). When fetal life is protected as a separate 
entity apart from the woman’s personhood in abortion and feticide statutes, then women will be 
seen as nothing more than life support systems for their fetuses rather than as people who happen 
to be pregnant. As a result, maternal life will be subordinated to fetal life, and women will be 
blamed for any perceived harm to their fetuses.  
 Mother blame plays into fetal personhood. If a woman is a danger to her fetus and the 
fetus needs protection, that implies the fetus is a person to protect. There were a few instances of 
mother blame in Patel’s case, mainly in the question of whether she could have done anything to 
save her fetus, assuming a live birth, in the moments after delivery. These instances of mother 
blame were addressed in some briefs, but not named as mother blame explicitly. For example, in 
the October 2nd appellant brief, Patel’s lawyers describe the legal and rhetorical trick State 
attorneys played to get a child abuse conviction: “[The prosecution] diverted focus from the 
relevant question of whether the baby would have had a chance had Purvi done something to the 
irrelevant question of whether the baby had a chance with Purvi doing nothing” (Patel v. State, 
2015, p. 15). The Indiana child neglect statute requires that there be some form of intervention a 
person could have taken to save a child and knowingly chose not to. By emphasizing Patel’s 
inaction rather than the fact that the fetus could have only had a chance of surviving with a 
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neonatologist intervention in the first minute after delivery8, the State essentially blames Patel for 
an unavoidable result of an early and likely unexpected delivery. Some briefs detail the State’s 
faulty logic in blaming Patel for not having the expertise of a neonatologist, i.e. mother blame, 
but the word “blame” is not used once in any of the briefs, despite the prevalence of mother 
blame in the State’s rhetoric. 
 Fetal personhood was sometimes emphasized in briefs in support of Patel, which may 
have been strategic in order to play on conservative Indiana court sympathies, but nonetheless 
reinforced systems of control for women, and particularly women of color, in the United States. 
Fetal personhood has increasingly been used to blame and prosecute women for their pregnancy 
outcomes. So adopting this language that prioritizes fetal life in the pro-Patel briefs has the effect 
of supporting possible future criminalizations of pregnancy.  
 
Patel’s Racialized Gender 
 Purvi Patel’s identity as an Indian American woman was a critical component of her case, 
but some briefs tended to ignore her intersectionality. This hesitancy manifested in the way the 
briefs discussed or did not discuss racial and/or sex discrimination, the jury’s positionality, and 
Patel’s Hindu faith. In this section, I argue the discussion of Patel’s racialized gender in the pro-
Patel briefs was, for the most part, incomplete.  
Throughout all the briefs, there seemed to be a hesitancy to talk about racial and/or sex 
discrimination. Patel’s lawyers did not use the word “discrimination” once in either appellant 
brief. The October 2nd amici brief was entirely about discrimination, as it detailed ways that 
women of color and impoverished women are specifically targeted by particular laws; yet the 
                                                          
8 Based on the defense’s review of 594 studies of non-hospital premature births, none of which suggested Patel’s 
fetus at its developmental stage could have survived for the time it took to get to a NICU (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 5). 
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word “discrimination” was never employed. The October 2nd authors note: “If the Court upholds 
this conviction, and allows prosecutors to link self-induced abortions with feticide, it will have 
cascading repercussions for all pregnant people, particularly those from marginalized 
communities” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 5). In this quote, “marginalized” becomes code for 
impoverished pregnant women, and particularly impoverished women of color. The brief authors 
argue these women will be discriminated against if Patel’s conviction is not overturned. The 
authors also say that “pregnant people often seek abortion because they cannot afford to have a 
child” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 11). The authors go on to argue that abortion needs to be 
accessible in order to avoid driving these people further into poverty. Raising concerns about 
affordability of abortion is a strong point, but the authors do not say anything about how poverty 
forces people who cannot afford a child to abort when the woman otherwise might have wanted a 
child. Poverty as constricting to women’s right to choose to have a child, then, is not mentioned 
at all, which is where a Reproductive Justice approach would take the discussion.  
Even those briefs that did mention discrimination in some capacity usually did not 
discuss discrimination based on multiple identities, a lapse that neglects the specific experiences 
of women of color. As an example, some briefs elaborated on the effects of sex discrimination 
but left it there without mentioning the unique discrimination women of color face, even though 
criminalization of pregnancy is something that women of color in particular are disproportionally 
targeted for. In the October 14th brief, the authors note, “Expecting [women to sacrifice their 
right to bodily autonomy and medical decisions free from intervention]…pregnant women, under 
threat of criminal prosecution, creates a gender-based discrimination that cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny” (brackets added) (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 14). This brief mentions only 
sex discrimination and does not investigate the multiple effects of sex, racial, and class 
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discrimination. In the October 14th brief, the authors repeatedly reference gender-based 
discrimination but are relatively quiet about race. For example, when talking about the State’s 
use of the feticide mandate in Patel’s case, the authors note: “Because such an interpretation of 
the law would uniquely burden women, it violates their constitutional right to equal protection” 
(Patel v. State, 2015, p. 12). This claim, while true, neglects to mention how women of color are 
particularly vulnerable to criminalized pregnancies. Such an oversimplification of the issue of 
criminalized pregnancy ignores the intersectionality of the women who usually face the threat of 
criminalization for their pregnancy outcomes.  
 Some briefs did discuss discrimination against multiple identities, however. The 
November 20th brief mentioned discrimination against intersecting identities more than any of 
the briefs. The authors argue that laws criminalizing abortion “discriminate against women and 
are applied in a discriminatory manner” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 13). The authors also highlight 
the fact that women of color and impoverished women are more likely to have poor birth 
outcomes and higher infant mortality rates. Then they go on to say these laws will “make all 
women who do not deliver a healthy baby a suspect,” and as a result, “it is poor and marginalized 
women who are prosecuted for miscarriages, obstetric emergencies and abortions” (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 12). The authors go on to detail how impoverished women of color in particular 
are targeted by abortion regulations because these women are subjected to higher levels of 
surveillance and held to unreasonable expectations: “[G]iving prosecutors the ability to choose 
whether to prosecute women following fetal demise can result in the targeting of poor women of 
color, whose behavior does not conform to the white, middle-class expectations about how a 
pregnant woman should behave” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 14). The idea of a “standard” for 
behavior while pregnant was also mentioned in the October 14th brief. The authors mentioned an 
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Illinois case in which the court ruled that mothers could not be held liable for what happens to 
the fetus prenatally. The judges argued that if this were allowed, then the judges would have to 
define a standard for what a good mother is, down to every detail, and the jury’s interpretations 
of these standards would undoubtedly be racist, classist, and sexist. 
 Patel’s jury was likely also influenced by racist and sexist standards of motherhood. Two 
briefs touched upon how the jury might see Patel and interpret her actions: the appellant brief 
from January and the October 14th amicus brief. These mentions, however, were fleeting and 
neglected how Patel’s positionality as a woman of color might have affected the jury’s opinions 
about the case. For example, the October 14th brief asked, “In what way would prejudicial and 
stereotypical beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women be kept from interfering with a 
jury's determination of whether a particular woman was negligent at any point during her 
pregnancy?” The January brief argued that the State’s dependence on the jurors’ beliefs about 
what they would do in Patel’s situation was misguided at best: “No juror's ‘own life experiences’ 
could provide a basis for determining what signs of life a profusely bleeding mother, a minute 
after delivery, would observe in a newborn weighing less than one-and-a-half pounds” (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 8; Patel v. State, 2015, p. 4). Neither of these briefs unpacked Patel’s racialized 
gender and how her racialized gender might impact the way jurors interpreted her case. 
According to the co-president of the Indiana Religious Coalition for Reproductive Justice, who 
was in the courtroom for Patel’s trial, Patel’s jury included no people of color (S.E. Braunlin, 
personal communication, February 5, 2018). Patel’s entirely white jury might not have 
understood the circumstances that led Patel to make the decisions she did, such as not going to 
the doctor.  
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 Patel’s identity as a Hindu woman and her Indian culture are present in two briefs. Her 
Hindu religion is prominent in only one legal brief, the appellant’s brief from October 2nd. Her 
Hinduism is discussed in relation to her father’s testimony about the unacceptability of pre-
marital sex in the Hindu religion. The brief does not specify the role her Hindu faith played in 
her life or how it might have shaped the way Patel was viewed and discussed by the jury. Patel’s 
identity as an Indian woman was alluded to in the October 2nd amici brief when the authors 
discuss poverty rates and birth outcomes among Asian American and Pacific Islander 
populations. The document they used for these statistics is a report by Josh Ishimatsu, the 
Director of Capacity Building and Research National Coalition for Asian Pacific American 
Community Development (National CAPACD) called “Spotlight on Asian American and Pacific 
Islander Poverty: A Demographic Profile.” The report separates Asian American and Pacific 
Islander populations based on country of origin. Indian Americans were the second most likely 
of Asian American populations to live in poverty (Ishimatsu, 2013, p. 11). The amici curiae 
briefs, by addressing these broad demographic categories, deemphasized the specificity of 
Patel’s life and circumstances, specifically with regard to her race/ethnicity as an Indian 
American woman. Yet her ethnicity likely impacted her interactions with various actors in her 
case, including the jury.9 For example, reporter Amy Gastelum, of Guernica, wrote about the 
detective who interviewed Patel, Galen Pelletier of the South Bend Police Department. This 
detective seemed particularly preoccupied with Patel’s Indian heritage, asking repeatedly 
whether the father of her fetus was Indian, too, and whether her friend with whom she was 
texting (Turnbo) was Indian (Gastelum, 2015). These questions show how central her identity as 
an Indian American woman was to her treatment. However, Patel’s race comes up in 
                                                          
9 One jury member reportedly commented that she decided Patel’s guilt after seeing how hairy the fetus was, a very 
racialized remark (S. E. Braunlin, personal communication, February 5, 2018).  
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inappropriate and prejudicial ways to harm her case and is simultaneously ignored in ways in 
which race is relevant, such as in jury selection.  
 Patel’s racialized gender was a critical component of her case. While some briefs did 
mention her intersectional positionality as a woman of color, for the most part these discussions 
were incomplete. The briefs often excluded discussions about discrimination in general, and 
discrimination based on multiple identities in particular. The briefs also favored simplifications 
of the case, either in neglecting how her identity as an Indian American woman might have 
impacted the jury, or overgeneralizing to the point of ignoring the fact that women of color are 
more impacted by criminalizations of pregnancy.  
 
Medical Privacy and Trust 
In this section, I discuss the tendency of the briefs to overstate the importance of the 
doctor-patient relationship. I argue the briefs did not acknowledge the ways in which the medical 
system and the legal system interlock to manage and surveil pregnant bodies. Framing the two as 
separate systems or framing the doctor-patient relationship as unproblematic ignores the history 
of doctors reporting their pregnant patients to authorities. In addition, there was a lack of 
attention paid to the role of faith-based Catholic healthcare systems in Patel’s case. 
Purvi Patel’s doctor seemed to be invested in the case to an unusual degree in that he 
went past his duty of “mandatory reporting” regarding his personal suspicions of child abuse: 
The day Patel arrived at the emergency room seeking treatment, this doctor actually left the 
hospital to go with the police to the “scene of the crime” (Patel v. State, 2015). This was not 
protocol or necessary; in fact, the doctor stated in an interview: “It was actually a very surreal 
moment. I decided there was nothing more for me to do at the hospital, so I would actually go 
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over to the Target store myself as well. Maybe I could help in some way” (Conrad, 2015). 
Tellingly, Dr. McGuire is listed as a member of the American Association of Pro-Life 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (Conrad, 2015). Though McGuire was a mandatory reporter of 
suspected child abuse, it should be noted that the only piece of evidence the hospital’s doctors 
had to go off of was an umbilical cord that might have been developed enough to indicate a 
premature fetus (Patel v. State, 2015). If that fetus had not been granted personhood and 
considered a child, the doctor making that report to the police would have been a HIPAA 
violation because he breached Patel’s right to confidential treatment.  
HIPAA— Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act— is a federal regulation 
regarding the release of medical data and doctor-patient confidentiality (“Summary of the 
HIPAA privacy rule: HIPAA compliance assistance,” 2003). The clause that specifically 
mandates criminal investigations in healthcare environments states that healthcare providers may 
provide confidential patient information to police under six conditions: (1) the information is 
legally required, “including court orders, court-ordered warrants, subpoenas” (“Summary of the 
HIPAA privacy rule: HIPAA compliance assistance,” 2003, p. 7); (2) the information is needed 
to find “a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or missing person” (“Summary of the HIPAA 
privacy rule: HIPAA compliance assistance,” 2003, p. 7); (3) if a police officer requests 
information about a victim or suspected victim of a crime; (4) to inform police about a patient 
death if the healthcare provider suspects a crime may have caused the patient to die; and (5) if a 
healthcare provider suspects that a crime has occurred on the provider’s premises and believes 
the information is necessary for the investigation of that crime. The sixth circumstance in which 
a doctor can disclose private medical records to law enforcement is if a medical provider 
determines “in a medical emergency not occurring on its premises, when necessary to inform law 
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enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location of the crime or crime 
victims, and the perpetrator of the crime” (“Summary of the HIPAA privacy rule: HIPAA 
compliance assistance,” 2003, p. 7). None of these scenarios apply to Patel’s case because Patel 
arrived saying she had miscarried, which is not a crime. 
The day Patel went to the hospital, law enforcement had not requested or subpoenaed any 
information from the hospital or the doctors. Patel’s hospital doctors freely reported the 
information to the police because they believed that Patel’s fetus was a child. Patel called it a 
miscarriage and not an attempted abortion, so by Patel’s accounts to the hospital, there was no 
criminal activity to report (Patel v. State, 2015). This demonstrates the concomitant nature of the 
healthcare and law enforcement systems, in that Patel’s body was simultaneously managed and 
surveilled by the hospital doctors and the police. The October 14th and November 20th briefs 
emphasized the importance of the doctor-patient relationship and blamed law enforcement 
agencies and legislators for interfering in that relationship. The November brief, for example, 
stated “human rights violations [occur] when health care professionals and facilities are treated 
as a source of evidence for potential prosecutions” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 16). This is a valid 
critique; interfering in the doctor-patient relationship and requiring doctors to make decisions 
based on the law rather than on their best judgement as a medical professional is problematic, as 
it undermines the care of the individual patient in favor of generalized legal mandates. However, 
framing law enforcement and legislation as “the bad guy” in situations like these is equally 
problematic because it erases the complicity of healthcare professionals in promoting and 
sustaining that discriminatory agenda, as demonstrated by Patel’s doctors reporting her to the 
police. In Patel’s case, the doctors’ agenda seems to have been faith-based, or at least guided by 
a politics of Christian faith.  
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Catholic healthcare systems in particular are an example of healthcare professionals 
promoting and sustaining discriminatory agendas. From 2001 to 2011, the number of Catholic 
hospitals grew over 16% while the number of public hospitals shrank by 31% (Uttley, et al., 
2013). The growth of Catholic facilities is not itself necessarily concerning; the issue comes from 
the fact that Catholic hospitals do not provide life-saving women’s reproductive healthcare, like 
tubal ligations in cases where a pregnancy would be dangerous for the woman, abortion, 
treatment for miscarriages that would prevent infection, and any form of contraceptive. The 
ACLU comments on this rapid growth of religion-driven healthcare and its subsequent 
consequences for women’s health: “Catholic hospitals…have organized into large systems that 
behave like businesses — aggressively expanding to capture greater market share — but rely on 
public funding and use religious doctrine to compromise women’s health care” (Uttley, et al., 
2013, p. 1). Any medical procedure that conflicts with Catholic teachings is prohibited in these 
facilities, which is problematic for women whose only healthcare option is Catholic hospitals. As 
of 2011, there were 30 Catholic healthcare systems across 18 states that were designated as “sole 
community hospitals,” meaning people living in those geographic areas have little choice but to 
go to those hospitals in an emergency (Uttley, et al., 2013, p. 25). Patel did go to a Catholic 
hospital. This fact was not mentioned or highlighted in any of the briefs, despite the hospital’s 
obvious Catholic name, “St. Joseph’s.” Catholic hospitals can be a barrier to women’s access to 
reproductive healthcare, so not mentioning this aspect of Patel’s case is not consistent with a 
Reproductive Justice approach.  
The briefs in general read as reluctant to highlight the problematic and discriminatory 
actions of the healthcare system, let alone to investigate how the healthcare system and law 
enforcement might be co-functioning as systems of control. The November 20th brief, for 
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example, discusses the “violation of women’s right to confidential health information and 
extracting confessions in health care settings” and how such a violation “can constitute cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 17). The brief again frames the 
violation as an issue with police interfering in an otherwise healthy interaction between a doctor 
and a patient. That is not the case because according to Reproductive Justice philosophy and 
other empirical measures, women of color, with good reasons, can distrust their medical 
providers; hence, these relationships are not always healthy. The October 14th brief mentions 
“colluding with law enforcement” in passing, but almost seems to attribute this action to a legal 
obligation to follow statutory law instead of thinking about how this “colluding” could be a 
complicity on the part of the healthcare system with the police state under which women of color 
live (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 10). As Jaremko Bromwich (2015) states, “law is not separate from 
but enmeshed within broader social discourses and processes” (p. 43).  
One example of law and healthcare being mutually constitutive in Patel’s case points to 
the circumstances of her questioning by police. The October 2nd appellant brief explained: 
“Detective Galen Pelletier questioned Purvi at 3:30 AM when she awoke from anesthesia” (Patel 
v. State, 2015, p. 7). However, this was the only mention in the briefs about Patel being 
questioned by police; there is no discussion of how this interrogation might have been improper. 
What the briefs missed is when women are investigated for criminal violations in healthcare 
settings, it makes the hospital or clinic a contentious place that women might choose to avoid 
rather than face the threat of prosecution. This effect is multiplied when healthcare workers are 
actively complicit in the criminalization of women seeking care. Such is the case for Purvi Patel, 
as her doctors freely reported her to authorities, which could be construed as a HIPAA violation.  
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The briefs did note that criminal prosecution of women of color like Purvi Patel for 
attempting their own abortions is not only legally inadmissible, but also morally wrong and a 
human rights violation. There were many troubling facts in Patel’s case that led some briefs to 
question directly whether her case was a violation of human rights, and what this meant for 
international human rights law if it were. The October 2nd appellant brief noted that “laboratory 
tests showed Purvi had by [at least an hour after arriving at the hospital] lost about 20% of her 
total blood volume” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 6-7). Despite this substantial blood loss, rather than 
immediately take Patel to have the surgery to remove the placenta, the doctors concerned 
themselves with investigating the possibility of a “baby.” Even as they prepared Patel for 
surgery, Dr. Byrne continued to press Patel about a “baby” and took the time to contact police. 
To continue to question Patel before her surgery after she had lost so much blood might be 
construed as making her treatment dependent on her admission of a “baby.” The November brief 
noted this as well, stating, “medical care should not be contingent on a woman’s cooperation…or 
used as evidence in any proceeding against her” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 16-17).   
Patel’s criminalization did not happen because law enforcement interfered in a healthy 
doctor/patient relationship. Patel’s criminalization happened because she is a woman of color 
living in a society in which healthcare systems and law enforcement work together to surveil and 
control certain bodies. The tendency of the briefs to overlook or neglect to mention this 
intersection is problematic because it frames the doctors who treated Patel as also victims of the 
law, rather than giving a more complex but accurate picture of the doctors as complicit in her 
criminalization. The fact that Catholic healthcare institutions were also not analyzed in the briefs 
again oversimplifies key aspects of Patel’s case.  
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Surveillance, Knowledge, and Legitimacy 
 Questions of legitimacy, knowledge, and surveillance permeated the briefs. Under what 
circumstances is abortion considered legitimate? Whose voices, whose expertise is considered 
legitimate? How does surveillance impact what is regarded as legitimate? Though pro-Patel 
briefs were arguing in defense of Patel and sometimes offered views compatible with 
Reproductive Justice and intersectionality, for the most part, the briefs left discussions about 
legitimacy, knowledge, and surveillance incomplete.   
The legitimacy of abortion was a topic of discussion in a couple briefs. The legitimacy of 
abortion is particularly diminished in cases of “self-directed care,” like in Patel’s case. Patel’s 
own lawyers say in their January brief, “reasonable people may condemn Purvi’s (or anyone 
else’s) decision to choose an abortion—particularly in the manner that Purvi did” (Patel v. State, 
2015, p. 12). This statement questions the legitimacy of self-abortion and also stigmatizes 
abortion in general. Alternatively, the October 2nd amici brief frames the choice to self-abort as 
an “expression of autonomy and a form of empowerment” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 8). I argue 
that self-abortion can be a form of resistance, but self-abortion also can be a necessity due to the 
barriers to access imposed by state legislatures, TRAP laws, law enforcement officials, and 
healthcare providers, not to mention faith-based hospitals.   
The October 2nd amici brief, citing public vs. private spheres, implied that self-induced 
abortions by impoverished women are seen as less legitimate. The brief mentions that 
impoverished women may have to have abortions in more “public spaces,” which, for 
impoverished women and particularly impoverished women of color, can include homes where 
there is the presence of police, parole officers, social workers, and other governmental officials 
whose job it is to surveil these women, a fact only mentioned by the October 2nd amici brief. 
Surveillance is omnipresent in the lives of women of color, particularly working class women of 
53 
 
color. Only one brief discussed surveillance, the October 2nd amici curiae brief. This brief 
discussed surveillance as disparately impacting communities of color, and particularly pregnant 
women of color. 
This surveillance is true for Patel’s case as well. The theme of Patel’s surveillance by 
police and hospital staff was ubiquitous throughout the briefs. In the October 2nd appellant brief, 
for example, Patel’s lawyers state, “As Dr. Byrne prepared Purvi for surgery to remove the 
placenta stuck to her uterine wall, Dr. McGuire contacted the police. When Purvi questioned 
why police would be there, Dr. Byrne continued to press that ‘there should be a baby’” (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 7). This excerpt shows how Patel was monitored and surveilled by the hospital 
employees. Then once Patel’s case was forwarded by hospital staff to police, the brief explains 
that a “large team of police” (as well as Dr. McGuire) went to search the area around Patel’s 
workplace, where she said she left the fetus, while other officers went to Patel’s house in search 
of evidence (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 7). At this point, Patel was claiming she had a miscarriage, a 
claim the hospital staff chose to treat as untrue. Because she was not trusted, the physicians 
involved the authorities. I will go so far as to suggest that because of Patel’s racialized gender, 
the police treated her case as a serious crime, sending out multiple police officers to multiple 
locations to investigate what would have been a misdemeanor at most if they had found evidence 
of an illegal abortion. There is a sad irony that the racism involved in criminalizing Patel’s 
reproductive decisions had the effect of elevating the missing brown fetus to the status of a 
missing person’s hunt. However, it is easier to promote the importance of the life of a “person” 
of color who is not yet a “person” than to support the life of a living woman of color who is also 
a citizen. 
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 The theme of trust and authority is also prevalent in these texts. Patel was the only one 
who will ever know what happened on the day in question, yet her authority was regarded as 
suspect from the moment she arrived at the hospital. The October appellant brief mentions that 
even when expert witnesses’ (e.g. the doctors called to the stand) testimony conflicts with one 
another, the courts do not and cannot question the validity of “expert” testimony. Thus, we are 
forced to question who is considered an expert in this case. Certainly, the briefs outline the ways  
Patel is not trusted. Patel’s knowledge of what happened that day was continuously discredited in 
favor of “expert testimony” from two doctors who contradicted each other. Patel’s lawyers note 
in January, “The defense by no means concedes there was a live birth, but understands this Court 
must accept the State’s expert on that point—despite the many flaws in his conclusion” (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 12). This underscores the legal authorities’ agreement regarding a legitimate 
source of knowledge. Patel does not fit the description, even though she was the only witness to 
the event upon which the proceedings hinge. As another example, Patel’s friend Fay is described 
as an “informal medical advisor” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 5). However, that title is not seen as 
valid by the State of Indiana because “informal medical advisors” are not within the medical 
system and thus cannot be surveilled by “official” channels of the medical establishment. 
 Patel was simultaneously discredited as a legitimate source of knowledge and also 
expected to be an expert. In the January brief, Patel’s lawyers note, “Dr. McGuire himself 
(having delivered over 2,000 babies) testified only a neonatologist could answer questions about 
newborns of that age and size” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 4). Yet Patel was expected to know 
exactly what to do in order to save the fetus’s life in the less than a minute it would have taken 
for the fetus to bleed out. Women are often required to be experts but then their knowledge is 
delegitimized by “experts.” For example, women are expected to have a natural “maternal 
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instinct,” and they simultaneously are dismissed as “just a woman,” “hormonal,” “emotional,” 
etc. These contradicting expectations are compounded for women of color. Patel’s case also 
highlighted the simultaneous expectation of both more and less from women of color. The 
disproportionate surveillance of Patel in this case and women of color in general shows how 
women of color are assumed to be “less” than white women and men in every sense. Yet, all the 
so-called “experts” involved in Patel’s case expected Patel to have the knowledge and skill 
miraculously to save a fetus that would likely never have survived. These expectations 
underscore the expectation of “more.” 
 The briefs in general could have had more effective conversations about legitimacy, 
knowledge, and surveillance. Problems with their rhetoric included incomplete or inconsistent 
analyses of abortion, surveillance, and expertise. Self-abortion is only acknowledged as 
legitimate in one brief. Patel’s lawyers undermine the legitimacy of abortion in general, but 
particularly self-abortion, by characterizing such a choice as unreasonable. The briefs also 
continuously deferred to “experts” in order to determine what happened, rather to than trust 
Patel’s account of what happened. At the same time, Patel was expected to know as much as a 
neonatologist in the moments following her miscarriage. The briefs, save for one, avoided the 
topic of surveillance, which directly impacts what is deemed legitimate in Patel’s case. Actions 
that cannot be surveilled are considered less legally legitimate, which impacts women of color at 
a disproportionate rate.  
 In this analysis, I have detailed four themes from the briefs: fetal personhood; racialized 
gender; medical privacy and trust; and surveillance, knowledge, and legitimacy. I showed that 
Patel’s fetus was personified in the briefs, even by her proponents who argued for her release. I 
argued the briefs sometimes highlighted and sometimes disregarded Patel’s identity as an Indian 
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American woman, which mostly worked to her disadvantage. In addition, the briefs overlooked 
the fact of the doctors’ complicity in criminalizing their patients, particularly in Catholic 
healthcare systems, as was the case for Patel. Finally, in the ways the briefs talked about 
surveillance, knowledge, and legitimacy, I found the authors often undermined Patel’s authority 
and knowledge and simultaneously expected her to be an expert. All of these factors lead me to 
conclude that the briefs’ arguments, while perhaps effective in convincing the Court of Appeals 
to overturn her conviction, often played into systems of control that exist to subjugate women 
and particularly women of color. In the final section, I conclude with implications of Patel’s 
case, including public health issues and legal precedent. As feminist legal studies is an approach 
concerned with reform in addition to analysis, I discuss the use of the feticide law against Patel 
and offer some suggestions for a change to the feticide law to prevent future criminalizations 
using this mandate.  
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CONCLUSION 
My analysis attempts to shed light on how the pro-Patel briefs discussed the various 
elements of Patel’s case, including: surveillance, legitimacy, discrimination, racialized gender, 
medical trust, privacy, and fetal personhood. I believe that pro-Patel briefs, even while arguing 
on behalf of or in support of Patel, often reinforced systems of control, such as the medical 
system and legal system. I showed how the documents sometimes afforded personhood to Patel’s 
fetus, ignored important issues like discrimination and surveillance, and oversimplified histories 
of criminalizations of pregnant women. My goal in analyzing these documents and highlighting 
the problems with their arguments has not been to dismiss or criticize the important work that 
these organizations did for Patel’s case and continue to do for other cases. My goal has been to 
underline ways in which the arguments could have been more effective and consistent with 
intersectionality and Reproductive Justice in order to place Patel’s case in conversation with 
other criminalizations of pregnant women of color. I believe doing so is important because 
Patel’s case, although unique in some ways, also echoes the long history of prosecuting women 
of color for their reproductive actions. Recognizing these connections can help feminist legal 
scholars determine what strategies are best for stopping criminalizations like Patel’s.  
In prosecuting Patel, the State of Indiana claims to be protecting fetuses. Though the 
intention of the State of Indiana may be to protect “fetal life,” the implications for pregnant 
women and mothers are noteworthy. In this conclusion, I highlight the potential for Patel’s case 
to spur negative repercussions for public health, as it may make women avoid life-saving 
58 
 
medical care for fear of criminalization. I also argue Patel’s case sets a legal precedent for the 
criminalization of pregnancy.  
Patel’s case has dangerous implications for women’s health nationwide as it has the 
potential to dissuade women who have attempted their own abortion from seeking medical 
attention. As the October 14th brief notes, “every major medical and public health association 
[including those that are opposed to abortion] in the U.S. agrees that women should not be 
prosecuted for their actions, inactions, or circumstances during pregnancy” (Patel v. State, 2015, 
p. 5). This is because criminalizing women for their pregnancy outcomes has dangerous 
repercussions for public health, as it deters women from seeking needed medical care in order to 
save their lives. Doing so essentially criminalizes seeking healthcare for certain issues like 
substance abuse and self-abortion and places countless women who might already be in 
vulnerable situations in further danger.  
The October 14th amici brief uses examples from several countries that have criminalized 
abortion to show how prosecution for self-aborting does not deter abortions, but instead causes a 
public health issue. It references El Salvador, a country where abortion is illegal in all cases and 
women are criminalized for abortion and suspected abortion. In El Salvador, the authors note, 
women and especially women in poverty often avoid medical care for pregnancy complications 
for fear of criminalization, even when their complications are not related to abortion at all. In 
Nicaragua, women have not yet been criminalized under a statute that was enacted in 2008 that 
provides for “lengthy” sentences for women and girls who have abortions, but the mandate has 
still prevented some from seeking emergency services (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 9). When women 
avoid emergency services for complications related to self-abortion or miscarriage for fear of 
police action, this fear can cause avoidable deaths. This is true especially for impoverished 
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women and women of color. If the purpose of criminalizing abortion is to save lives, under the 
guise of preventing illegal and presumably unsafe abortions, then this begs the question of whose 
life is being saved. Evidence in the pro-Patel briefs points to the inadequacy and impropriety of 
criminalization for desired health outcomes. In other words, those passing laws that criminalize 
abortion intend to save lives, but in doing so, they are causing more deaths than if abortion was 
safe, legal, and accessible.  
Another factor that may have negative implications for public health aside from 
criminalizing abortion is stigmatizing and stereotyping abortion. When abortion is stigmatized, 
women might be more reluctant to obtain one and end up having children they otherwise would 
not have wanted. Or women might proceed with pregnancies that put their own health at risk. It 
is this stigmatization of abortion that allows prosecutors to misuse statutes such as feticide to 
criminalize women who try to end their own pregnancies because jurors and judges alike take 
their prejudices against abortion into the courtroom and convict women for charges that do not 
fit, as in Patel’s case. Abortion remains a legal procedure in the United States, although it is 
increasingly inaccessible and criminalized.  
 Patel’s positionality as a middle-class woman of color likely impacted her decision to 
purchase the miscarriage-inducing drugs online rather than go to a doctor. Turnbo noted that the 
cost of an abortion would likely be around $300-400, whereas the misoprostol and mifepristone 
cost only $72. Turnbo was referring to a specific abortion provider in South Bend. Across 
Indiana, the cost is higher. According to the website for Indiana University Health, one of the 
major medical providers in Indiana, “Depending on the method, the charges will be between 
$450-$500. Health insurance sometimes will pay for an abortion,” but only in certain cases. In 
2015, a little over 10 percent of American women were still uninsured (Women’s Health 
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Insurance Coverage, 2016). Even if women are able to access insurance, “Indiana also has 
restrictions on private insurance coverage of abortion—forbidding companies from covering 
abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or severe risk to life,” according to the October 2nd amici 
brief (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 8). This means that abortion is legal in Indiana, but only for women 
who can afford to pay for it out of pocket. The decision to have a child is a life-altering choice; 
women should not be forced to follow through with unwanted pregnancies. 
The cost of a legal abortion poses a real material barrier for women who are not in a 
position to spend hundreds of dollars. As the October 2nd amici brief notes, “The average cost of 
a first trimester abortion is equivalent to nearly a quarter of the monthly average per capita 
income in Indiana. Second trimester abortions can cost two or three times as much” (Patel v. 
State, 2015, p. 7). Saving money to obtain an abortion is generally not possible either, as waiting 
longer to save up the money makes it cost more because it becomes a later term abortion, 
“further entrenching pregnant people and their families in poverty” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 8). 
Many women cannot even afford to make the trip to an abortion clinic, as some women do not 
have an abortion clinic nearby nor the financial resources to get there. In fact, “[i]n Indiana…93 
percent of counties had no abortion clinic, and 61 percent of Indiana women lived in counties 
without an abortion clinic” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 7). Many women cannot afford to take off 
work for that much travel if their jobs offer no paid time off or pay employees an hourly wage. 
Additionally, many women, if they already have children, cannot afford childcare for their trip to 
the clinic. This problem with accessibility is further compounded for women who do not have 
access to safe, reliable, affordable, and/or prompt transportation. Restrictions that require a 
waiting period between initial appointment and actual abortion further restrict these women, as 
they must take off work and make the trip twice. These are the effects of TRAP laws and they 
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impact impoverished women and women of color more than white women or upper-class 
women. Those who can afford abortions, therefore, are not prosecuted because they have enough 
resources to fit within the increasingly narrowly constructed bounds of legal abortion. 
Another barrier to women’s reproductive rights is the expectation for women to know 
and understand the “intricacies of state abortion statutes” (McCormack v. Hiedeman, 2012). 
Expecting women to explore the ins and outs of complicated abortion and feticide laws amounts 
to an undue burden, especially for women who might not speak English as a first language or at 
all, women who might not have as much as a high school diploma let alone a law degree, and 
women who do not have access to legal documents, the internet, or legal guidance. Even the 
news coverage of Patel’s case could have imposed an undue burden on women’s right to choose 
as it showed women that a woman can and has been sentenced for a felony to 20 years in prison 
for attempting to end a pregnancy outside of legal bounds. If “any woman knows that choosing 
to have an abortion puts her in jeopardy of prosecution, regardless of her complete good faith—
and knows that the only way to avoid that risk is to forgo the abortion,” women’s right to choose 
whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy is impeded (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 23). 
Regardless, according to case law, statutory law, advocacy organizations, and even anti-abortion 
organizations, women should not be prosecuted for their own abortions.  
This case was significant not just because Patel was charged with and convicted of 
feticide, but also because Patel was charged with and convicted for contradictory charges: child 
neglect, which requires a live child, and feticide, which by definition is the killing of a fetus prior 
to birth, or as the statute phrases it, the termination of a pregnancy. The State of Indiana got 
away with this contradiction by arguing that “a live birth undeniably constitutes the termination 
of a pregnancy” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 9). Patel’s lawyers refer to this as a “gerrymandered 
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definition,” and they have a point: The feticide statute was not meant to cover a live birth. If it 
did, every single person who gave birth would be guilty of feticide. The October 14th brief argues 
that using the feticide statute in the way that the State proposes, by allowing a woman to be 
prosecuted for feticide for her pregnancy outcomes, would render the statute unconstitutionally 
vague because it would create an endless number of behaviors that could be interpreted as a 
violation of the law. That the law could be misused in Patel’s case and produce a conviction 
suggests the law is already unconstitutionally vague. The October 14th brief states, “A statute is 
void for vagueness if it ‘fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to 
understand what conduct it prohibits’” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 11). That Patel could be convicted 
by a jury under the feticide statute for allegedly having a live birth suggests that ordinary people 
might not understand what the feticide statute prohibits, which renders the feticide statute 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Due to the vagueness of the feticide statute and the fact that it provides personhood and 
thus victim status to the fetus, I believe feticide statutes should be revised to adequately address 
the problem they were designed to solve: harm to the pregnant woman. The October 2nd 
appellant brief argues, “A proper construction of the Feticide Statute, therefore, requires that it 
be viewed…as an extension of the laws of homicide to cover the situation in which the victim is 
not a ‘human being’…but a fetus” (Patel v. State, 2015, p. 17). It is a step in the right direction to 
specify that a fetus is not a human being. But this language of “a fetus is not a human being” 
does not stop the personification of the fetus, as feticide statutes are still used in ways that 
personify the fetus, such as Patel’s case. A more effective tactic, in my opinion, would be to 
impose stricter punishments for violent acts against pregnant women. In doing so, the fetus 
would not be personified as it would remain a part of the pregnant woman rather than its own 
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entity, and the pregnant woman would be less likely to be harmed or criminalized for actions 
regarding her own pregnancy. Another option would be making the termination of a woman’s 
pregnancy without her consent a violation of the law; that way it would be impossible to 
prosecute a woman for her own pregnancy loss. France has established a similar standard in 
which the fetus is “protected indirectly through the woman’s body of which it [is] an extension” 
(Patel v. State, 2015, p. 11). I believe these approaches offer a potential solution that addresses 
the problem of affording personhood to fetuses under the law and that is consistent with 
Reproductive Justice.  
The main weakness of my research is the limited scope. Though focusing on the pro-
Patel arguments was useful for the purposes of this thesis, a more comprehensive analysis of 
Patel’s case that includes arguments against Patel would be a beneficial next step for future 
research. As previously mentioned, Patel’s case is not entirely unique. An analysis or even a 
cross-analysis of other cases of criminalized pregnancy, such as the cases of Bei Bei Shuai, 
Jennifer Johnson, and others, would be useful.  
There is relatively little recent literature about the criminalizations of women of color for 
their pregnancies. Most of what I found was either non-academic (Amnesty International, 2017; 
Gastelum, 2015) or 15 or more years old (Boyd, 1999; Humphries, 1999; Roberts, 1997). With 
cases like Patel’s and in our current political climate, this area of research becomes politically 
critical. Patel’s case is unique because it was the first time a woman was convicted in the United 
States under the feticide statute for attempting her own abortion. However, her case is also part 
of a wider pattern of criminalized pregnancies that should be investigated in depth in order to 
discover ways of combating these injustices. In addition, though this case is mainly concerned 
with the right to say “no” to having a child, we should not lose sight of the fact that many 
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women, particularly women of color and working class women, have lost the ability to say “yes” 
to having children. As Briggs (2017) so aptly puts it, “We have been debating abortion, birth 
control, and the means of preventing unwanted pregnancies vigorously and at length for two 
generations, but while we were looking there, many people lost the ability to have the children 
they wanted” (p. 148). Fighting for both the right to say “yes” and the right to say “no” to having 
children is the only way to be truly intersectional and Reproductive Justice-minded, and both are 
essential when discussing women’s reproductive rights.  
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